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Time For New Glasses
A Discussion of Social Policy in a Global Economy
R. K. Morris*
I. SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTEXT AND IN A
CHANGING WORLD
T he first order of business of course is to congratulate Henry King
and to thank him for this important and impressive conference. The
topic choice in my view is brilliant, as fitting to the times we live in as
any subject could be. The execution is clearly superb as evidenced by
the outstanding lineup of speakers. He and his colleagues at The Ca-
nada/U.S. Law Institute and at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law deserve high praise.
To be candid, I am not certain that I have a great deal to contrib-
ute to a discussion of "the integrating impact of trade and its effect on
the ability of sovereign governments to use social policy as a lever to
effect social changes." What I will try to do is suggest ways of looking
at the problem, in other words, to offer a few thoughts on aggregation
and disaggregation of the concepts of trade and social policy. The mas-
sive social problems that are caused by the billions of dollars worth of
illegally traded drugs that enter the United States every year clearly
present a different kind of relationship between social policy and trade
than one sees, for example, in national security export controls or agri-
cultural subsidies.
I have done what I can by way of damage control. I have added a
new title, Time For New Glasses, in other words a new way of looking
at America in the world, and I shall, at least, begin with a safe, appar-
ent non-sequitur, though I hope it will seem relevant by the time I have
finished.
Some of you may recognize the name Le Ly Hayslip. She is a
Vietnamese American. Today she lives in San Diego. She grew up in a
rice farming village, Ky La, outside Da Nang, Vietnam. She has writ-
ten impressive accounts of both her experiences in Vietnam and her life
in the United States. Mrs. Hayslip's transformation from Vietnamese
peasant girl to successful American business woman is itself a fascinat-
ing illustration of how the kaleidoscope of the modern global economy
affects individual lives. The fact that she is now operating clinics in
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Vietnam and the fact that there are thousands of human echoes to her
story in the United States and Canada only underscore her value as
such a symbol.
I would like to share with you Mrs. Hayslip's description of her
first meal in the Continental United States with her first American
husband and his relatives:
We sat down for my first American dinner and I shyly waited to see
what everyone else did first. I knew some Americans said prayers for
their food, perhaps to honor the dead animal they were about to eat,
but this seemed like a silly custom. There was a time for praying and
a time for eating. Did those same people say prayers when they did
other ordinary things-when they made love or went shopping or re-
lieved themselves. I just didn't understand their reasoning, particu-
larly since Americans didn't seem like particularly spiritual people.
And then a sentence or two later:
My next hurdle was faking the use of their cumbersome eating uten-
sils. In Vietnam, all food was taken with chopsticks or slurped from a
bowl. Here, Americans employed as many utensils [in eating] as the
cook had used to prepare the meal.2
Already, Mrs. Hayslip has given us a lot of food for thought. For
example, whether we are talking about styles of eating, attitudes to-
ward religion and the family, or the interplay between the cross-border
social and economic activities of private citizens versus the habit of
states to try to manage international relations, her life gives a useful
context to questions that are relevant here.
The fact that she came of age in Vietnam only makes the case
more poignant. There is a sentence that could lead to a lot. For now,
we shall leave most of its radiating roads unexplored. One of those
thoughts, though, merits mention. It is, in effect, my theme for this
evening, which is that the United States needs to start thinking and
acting like a smaller country at least insofar as commercial policy is
concerned - not less sovereign, just smaller. In that sense, we could
learn a lot from both Canada and from Vietnam.
When I say a smaller country, I do not mean one that is in any
fundamental way less ambitious. Certainly, I do not mean one with a
lower growth rate or GDP. I do mean one that increasingly accounts
for a smaller share of world GDP. More specifically, I mean a country
that is less able to change distasteful external realities, and so must
adapt to them. And I mean a country that must take greater care in
ensuring that the coin of influence abroad is spent in the service of
I LE LY HAYSLIP. CHILD OF WAR, WOMAN OF PEACE 15 (Anchor Books, Doubleday, New
York 1993).
2Id.
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clear national interests.
The point about a declining share of the world's wealth is easy
enough to demonstrate. In 1968, for example, the United States ac-
counted for approximately one third of total world output. By 1990,
that was down to one quarter. More startling still, last year Japan sur-
passed the United States as the world's largest manufacturing econ-
omy, according to Kenneth Courtes of Deutsche Bank in Tokyo.
Measurements of this kind are undoubtedly imprecise, and even in
today's world a $6.5 trillion GDP still makes the United States the
largest economy in the world. The fact that other people are richer
than they used to be is certainly not bad news. Rich countries are bet-
ter customers and better neighbors than poor ones. That is what many
of us argued throughout the NAFTA debate, specifically that a richer
Mexico would be a better neighbor than a poorer one. Still, in relative
terms our influence is less than it used to be. The oft quoted observa-
tion that the United States, once the world's largest creditor, is now the
world's largest debtor is just another illustration of the same point.
Back to Vietnam for a moment. I very much hope that we can
soon establish a normal trading relationship with Vietnam, such as Ca-
nada, Australia, and Japan already have. It is hard not to wonder,
though, how much influence the United States will have in that country
in, say, five years, when we finally sign a long-overdue trade agreement
with the Vietnamese. Will we really be competitive there against our
Japanese rivals who have been trading with Vietnam since 1975, and
who will have been indirect beneficiaries of the project oriented loans
from the Japanese government to Vietnam? Those loans started flowing
again last year (1993).
At this point, I would like to start listing things. I would like to list
the underlying premises of these short remarks. I would like to list the
factors I would urge you to regard as primary in considering interna-
tional commercial developments. And I should like to list a few areas of
social policy for consideration.
II. CONTINUATION OF THE NATION-STATE
First the premises. I take it as a given that the nation-state will
continue as the world's most important unit of political cooperation. I
suspect Michael Hart knows the leader of the Parti Quebecois, Jacques
Perizeau, as I do not. A few years ago, though, I did have an opportu-
nity to sit at a dinner table and to listen to him for a couple of hours.
He is a captivating man.
His argument about the size of nations was quite compelling. It
was the argument mentioned earlier this afternoon to the effect that, in
today's world, it really does not matter how large a country is, so long
as it is part of a larger trading unit, such as the European Union or
North America. Whether or not that idea is valid for Quebec is not a
3
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question that I am brave enough to tackle.
As a general proposition, however, I do not accept the thesis.
Small countries may not long for absorption, but big countries have
powerful incentives for wanting to remain big. Commercial advantage
is probably not the most significant of these. Countries, like couples,
have lots of reasons for staying together. Commerce is only one of
them.
Even the most cursory look at civil wars, often struggles to stay
together or come together, whether here in the United States or around
the world, should quickly convince anyone that countries stay together,
often at great cost, for the sake of a national vision, for reasons of
cultural and, yes, racial identity and from a deep fear of anarchy. But
there is also a commercial argument for cohesion. Big countries have
more clout.
III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ETC...
I also take it as a given that international institutions will be even
more important in the years ahead than they have been in the past.
This is especially true of the new World Trade Organization (WTO),
assuming of course that the U.S. Congress approves the appropriate
implementing legislation between now and July 1995.
No one should confuse the World Trade Organization, the United
Nations or any other international institution with world government.
We can expect, though, that the WTO will become an increasingly im-
portant mechanism for managing commercial conflicts among nations,
and for moderating the hostilities of bilateral disputes.
I am willing to trust it for the same reason I trust my calculator,
though perhaps not as much. The rationale of the faith is nevertheless
the same: It is difficult to imagine how a rigged system could function.
With so many countries involved - 119 and growing - and with so
many different interests at play, any system other than an essentially
fair one would be quickly doomed.
IV. THE PRIMARY FACTORS OF TRADE
When I sit back and try to distill the meetings, telephone calls and
press reports, it seems to me that commerce in the global economy is
about three things, the interplay of three driving forces. That is two
more than Freud or Jack Palance would allow, but still a manageably
small number. Sex cubed, if you will.
In no particular order these are:
" the drive for markets;
* the drive for efficiency; and
* the drive for development.
These factors affect every rich country and every aspiring poor country.
[Vol. 20:339 1994
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They are constantly interacting dynamically with one another and with
virtually every policy goal that societies have or contemplate. Success
in these areas means wealth, and failure means poverty or relative pov-
erty. And on that difference hang all but the most contemplative na-
tional aspirations.
V. MARKETS
The drive for markets is perhaps the oldest, most clearly recog-
nized characteristic of nations engaged in international trade. Yet it,
like the other two, acquires a new intensity in the global economy. This
may be more the case for the United States than for Canada and cer-
tain other countries. Today, it is something just short of a platitude to
note that fewer and fewer companies are willing to ignore exports be-
cause of the vastness of the U.S. domestic American market. But this is
a relatively new development.
Ira Magaziner, now an architect of the Clinton health care plan,
and Robert Reich, now in charge of the Department of Labor, wrote a
book together a few years back entitled, Minding America's Business.
It contained the startling figure that 70% of all American products
compete against foreign products, either in foreign markets or in the
U.S. market. Doubtless that number would be much higher if they
were to recalculate it.3
In general, American firms do not have any market reserved to
them and need to participate in markets around the world. If they do
not, they will be eclipsed by their internationally more successful for-
eign rivals. But there is more to it. Increasingly, we see more and more
diffusion of production, with firms and regions specializing in compo-
nents rather than final products. The corollary to that is the effort on
the part of companies, especially multinational companies, to supply
broader geographic areas from fewer locations. I suspect that this dy-
namic is one of the things reflected in the fact that 40 % of U.S. mer-
chandise trade is in fact intra-company trade. The point is that these
two trends - increasing product diffusion and the movement toward
fewer if not single sources of supply for discreet items - fuel the drive
for markets. If you are selling palaces or cathedrals, you might be able
to get by with just one buyer, one sale a year or a lifetime. This is not
the case if you are selling door knobs.
When I think about the drive for markets, I think of it primarily
as something that companies do. The best companies are bloodhounds
for markets. Governments become involved as facilitators. Obvious ex-
amples of such facilitation are the tariff reductions under NAFTA and
the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
3 IRA C. MAGAZINER AND ROBERT B. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS, THE DECLINE
AND RISE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 32 (Vintage Books, New York, February 1983).
5
Morris: Time for New Glasses: A Discussion of Social Policy in a Global E
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1994
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
(GATT). In some cases, governments are even more obvious allies of
the corporate search for markets, as the U.S. government rightly was in
the case of the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, which has be-
come a model for certain kinds of government intervention. The job of
finding markets, however, is primarily a job of private companies, and
government is as likely to be a hindrance as a help.
The current debate over U.S. trade with China should suffice as an
illustration of this point. American firms have done their work. They
have found tremendous opportunities in China, opportunities on which
many of their futures depend. I for one would submit that their success
is very much in the national interest of the United States. To the extent
that Canada depends on a number of these same companies to generate
both jobs and national economic success, it is also in the national inter-
est of Canada. Yet it is jeopardized by U.S. policy. But that is an issue
for later.
VI. EFFICIENCY
As for the drive for efficiency, its simplest expression is the goal to
produce products more cheaply. Certainly that is not a new phenome-
non. And yet it is. Firms with dominant and secure shares of large
domestic markets, where they are looked to as major employers, have
an interest in efficiency, of course. They do not have a passion for it.
Passion comes when one's survival is threatened by more efficient
rivals.
From my newspaper reader's vantage point, it seems to me that a
lot of firms got passionate about efficiency in the last decade. The
thousands of people who were laid off as a consequence of downsizing
and restructuring are part of the evidence for that. So too, I would
argue, is the greater competitiveness today of American firms, and the
fact, for example, that we have reclaimed from Japan the honor of be-
ing the world's largest producer of automobiles.'
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA were also
part of the drive for efficiency as it expressed itself in North America.
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and American
manufacturers argued that the opportunities for production rationaliza-
tion were among the principal advantages offered by these agreements.
Further, it is my impression that making their own firms more effi-
cient was among the reasons listed by the governments of Canada and
' Subsequently, The World Competitiveness Report 1994 listed the United States as the
world's most competitive country, followed by Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong and Germany. This
assessment, prepared by the International Institute for Management Development in Lausanne,
Switzerland, and the World Economic Forum in Geneva is, in effect, further evidence of
America's enhanced efficiency, even though the assessment itself depends upon several other fac-
tors as well.
[Vol. 20:339 1994
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Mexico for pursuing these agreements.
Notwithstanding those governmental actions in pursuit of effi-
ciency - and trade agreements are acts of governments - the drive
for efficiency is manifested first and foremost in the behavior of firms.
VII. DEVELOPMENT
The drive for development, however, the third of our three trade
factors, is best thought of as a government pursuit. It is through devel-
opment that governments try to fulfill some of the essential mandates
of government.
I refer to the mandate to assist their citizens in the pursuit of
richer, better lives - "A chicken in every pot," etc. . . . I refer to the
mandate to defend the nation and the people against "all enemies, for-
eign and domestic." And I refer to the mandate to protect the honor of
the nation by maintaining or advancing its standing in the various na-
tional league tables of the world.
In using the term development, I emphatically do not mean what
our current lexicon suggests, namely something poor countries do. It is
something that all countries do or strive to do, whether implicitly or
explicitly.
In any event, the techniques employed by governments in the pur-
suit of development interact in fascinating ways with the pursuit by
firms of markets and efficiency. In a nutshell, governments, with some
regularity, compel firms to buy markets at the expense of efficiency in
the name of development.
As you know, the tricks of this trade have a thousand names and
faces. To list a few: "buy national" policies, compulsory licensing,
forced investment and forced production sharing, and, of course
subsidies.
The reference to subsidies is worth a moment's comment if only
because it tends to highlight the notion of America thinking like a
smaller country, the idea that I mentioned earlier. Those of you who
followed the subsidies issue in the Uruguay Round will know that, at
the start of the Round, the philosophical position of the United States
was simple. All subsidies to commercial enterprises are wrong and pre-
sumptively harmful to U.S. interests. U.S. goals in these negotiations
were, first, to preserve and enhance U.S. countervailing duty law and,
second, to try to increase international discipline over subsidies. The
view held by most of our trading partners, including Canada, has long
been that subsidies are a legitimate tool of government.
I know it is a long time to wait for a punch line, but surely some-
one somewhere laughed or smiled just a little when the Clinton Admin-
istration officials found themselves on Capitol Hill, justifying their ne-
gotiating tactics in this area on the basis of the need to protect U.S.
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subsidies from challenge.'
As in so many debates, virtually everyone who has become in-
volved in the subsidies discussions has a valid observation and is right
to a certain extent. My purpose here is not to speak for or against
either subsidies or U.S. policy. I do think it is interesting, though, that
the U.S. government is again willing to acknowledge that subsidies can
be legitimate tools, not simply for national defense, but for advancing
U.S. economic development.
Rightly or wrongly, I feel some obligation to relate these com-
ments to the GATT and to U.S. policy more generally. It was a former
Deputy Director General of the GATT who once said to me that the
purpose of the GATT is to get governments out of trade. Well, I do not
think that is ever going to happen, nor should it. Even the U.S. Consti-
tution cites promoting the general welfare as a reason for bringing the
government into existence. Governments have too big a stake in trade
to stay out completely. On the other hand, they desperately need a
credible system of cooperation with agreed limits for state interference.
That is what the World Trade Organization can be and should strive to
become. The assumption is that each government will be sufficiently
jealous of its own development to ensure that there are limits on the
use of market-distorting development tools by others. And the hope is
that an acceptable balance can be struck within the scope of the new
GATT.
VIII. SOCIAL POLICIES
Because I believe that development writ large is social policy, I
believe I have already discussed this topic. Even so, it may help to men-
tion other, specific social policies and see how they are affected by this
three-engine machine of trade.
IX. LABOR
Labor policy questions are perhaps the oldest companion of the
trade debate. And they will remain part of that debate. Yet I would
guess that, in fact, the world has entered a new era. The world in
which good jobs could be protected with high tariffs or other protec-
tionist devices is rapidly vanishing. For the reasons mentioned above,
major investments need relatively open borders. In general, investors
cannot afford to site production in high tariff, high protection countries.
Certainly, there are important exceptions. The Europeans have not
given up on using tariffs to compel investment, and the Russians are
5 See, e.g., the March 9, 1994 testimony of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador
Rufus Yerxa, before the Senate Finance Committee. The record of this hearing has not yet been
printed but should be available later this year.
[Vol. 20:339 1994
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clearly flirting with the idea. But it is pass6. For my money, that is the
big lesson of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. We will be dealing
with adjustment issues for as long as we live, but the trend is clearly
away from protection, and I suspect it is irreversible. Once one accepts
that notion, the labor problem ceases to be a trade problem. It is a
problem of education, health, and corporate efficiency, but it is less and
less an issue of trade policy.
I recognize that such an assessment seems to fly in the face of the
Administration's goal of using the World Trade Organization as a fo-
rum for discussing the relationship between trade and labor policies
around the world. Doubtless those discussions will go forward, and
doubtless they will serve to highlight differences in the labor policies
and labor conditions in the various countries that will constitute the
membership of the WTO. In these circumstances it would be worse
than naive to suggest that the connection between labor policies and
trade policies will simply wither away. Rather what I am suggesting
here is that it is a one-way connection: Good labor policies, namely
those that generate a highly skilled, motivated and well compensated
work force, can improve the country's trade performance. There is,
however, no easy or obvious trade policy instrument that can, by itself,
improve the lot of any country's workers.
X. HEALTH, EDUCATION, CRIME
And what about health, education, and crime? Clearly addressing
America's serious problems in these areas is critical. Frighteningly high
crime rates and alarmingly large pools of poorly educated citizens un-
dermine competitiveness. Addressing them can only help America in its
international economic relations. Pressure and criticism may shame us
some, but neither they nor trade deficits can really inspire us to deal
with these threats. That motivational task will be done by stimuli closer
to home.
The only important question here, then, is this: Will our interna-
tional obligations, commitments, and relationships pose a bar to dealing
with these large American social issues? There is no reason why they
should with one caveat. This is that, in terms of competitiveness, pay-
ing for things is not the problem: the problem is how you pay for them.
As was mentioned earlier today, the U.S. tax system is already back-
ward when viewed in terms of trade competitiveness. One hopes that
when we raise taxes to deal with these domestic challenges, as we are
likely to do, we can find ways to do it that do not add further burdens
to American exporters.
XI. ENVIRONMENT
Environmental issues are somewhat different. Environmental con-
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ditions and environmental policies can place physical limits on produc-
tion. Moreover, many, though not all, of the environmental problems
we face can be managed only through international cooperation. And,
of course, the environmental community - that is, the non-governmen-
tal organizations that specialize in environmental issues - has discov-
ered trade. It has not yet, however, discovered the limits of its ability to
use the trading system in the service of environmental objectives.
It seems to me that this is one of those areas where it can only
serve American interests to think like a smaller country: one that must
acknowledge the interests of others and one that is more likely to be
the victim than the beneficiary of its own unilateralism.
XII. NATIONAL VALUES
My reaction when I read the description of this evening's discus-
sion topic, namely trade and social policy, was, "I think a French
farmer could deal with this much better than I will be able to." What I
could not shake was the fact that, in my day-to-day life this spring, the
nexus is not so much between trade and U.S. social policy. It is be-
tween trade and the social policies of others, namely China. Here I
think we presume too much, and we are burdened by the Cold War
history that we are having such great difficulty in shaking.
Not long ago, for example, I was in the office of a Congressman, a
thoughtful person who was generous to share his time with a small del-
egation of business representatives. After we explained the importance
of China to U.S. manufacturers he said, "But surely you are not advo-
cating a simple extension of MFN [Most Favored Nation]." We said
we were.
One of the companies on the visit went on to point out the diffi-
culty of alternatives such as selective trade sanctions. As some of you
may know, that thought has gotten a lot of discussion. Specifically, one
hears proposals for trade sanctions against the state owned entities in
China. The corporate representative, whose company produces a range
of products, explained that all of his firm's customers are state owned
enterprises.
The Congressman replied by noting that, it was a difficult choice,
because, while one did not wish to interrupt U.S. sales, he said, neither
did we want to build up the organs of the state in China.
I would submit that such an analysis presumes a level of conflict
between the United States and China which we should ardently seek to
avoid. That is, it presumes that our goal is the destruction of their gov-
ernment. We may hope for change, but we should operate on the as-
sumption of peaceful cooperation and significant but limited U.S.
influence.
[Vol. 20:339 1994
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XIII. CONCLUSION
I have referred a few times to the notion that America needs to
think of itself as a smaller country, and I said that it was time for a
new pair of glasses. What happens when you change from one pair to
another? Well you get a different picture. This analogy could be an-
noying to the non-American, anthropocentric among you. Do not let it
be. No nationality is being equated with any animal. It is making a
different point.
In the first image, using the old glasses, Uncle Sam is a rotund
and confident country squire walking with his hounds. When you
change the glasses, he is a thinner, weary, L. L. Bean-clad weekend
walker in the country who has gone too far. He is seen surrounded by
wolves, stamping his foot at them and saying, "Heel."
Times have changed. We need to adapt. I think we in North
America are good at that. And as for social policy, trade is not a threat
to any of our hopes or aspirations. The threat rather is from insularity
and from the political system's slow appreciation of the importance of
trade and the reality of the global economy.
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